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This paper was initially written for an oral presentation at a seminar organised by the Legal Intersections 
Research Centre at the University of Wollongong. Translating it into a text form for a wider readership has 
not proved easy, given the lively, loud and gendered court-room dialogue upon which it draws is unable to 
be reproduced. The article commences with a brief sketch of some of the defining characteristics of 
research in feminist crimino-legal studies. This part of the paper assumes some familiarity with the 
epistemological debates that have hovered over social science research since the challenges of post-
enlightenment philosophies to modernist knowledge claims. Then, reflecting on my own experiences as a 
witness subpoenaed before the Police Integrity Commission (PIC), the paper illustrates how the 
alignment between legal method with scientific positivism discredits feminist research in crimino-legal 
studies in much the same way as the legal process systematically disqualifies rape victims. I aim to 
demonstrate how this process of disqualification entails the asymmetrical arrangement of gendered 
bodies and spatiality in the hearing room, as well as the coercive exercise of a masculinist invalidation 
which operates through a micro-physics of power incompatible with the espoused judicial rhetoric of 
'objectivity and neutrality'. The paper concludes with a salutary note about the future of feminist research 
in crimino-legal studies. 
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Kerry Carrington 
 
 
Introduction 
  
This paper was initially written for an oral presentation at a seminar organised by the Legal 
Intersections Research Centre at the University of Wollongong. Translating it into a text form for a wider 
readership has not proved easy, given the lively, loud and gendered court-room dialogue upon which it 
draws is unable to be reproduced. The article commences with a brief sketch of some of the defining 
characteristics of research in feminist crimino-legal studies. This part of the paper assumes some 
familiarity with the epistemological debates that have hovered over social science research since the 
challenges of post-enlightenment philosophies to modernist knowledge claims. Then, reflecting on my 
own experiences as a witness subpoenaed before the Police Integrity Commission (PIC), the paper 
illustrates how the alignment between legal method with scientific positivism discredits feminist research 
in crimino-legal studies in much the same way as the legal process systematically disqualifies rape 
victims. I aim to demonstrate how this process of disqualification entails the asymmetrical arrangement 
of gendered bodies and spatiality in the hearing room, as well as the coercive exercise of a masculinist 
invalidation which operates through a micro-physics of power incompatible with the espoused judicial 
rhetoric of 'objectivity and neutrality'. The paper concludes with a salutary note about the future of 
feminist research in crimino-legal studies. 
 
Feminist Approaches to Crimino-Legal Research 
 
Epistemological debates about the relationship between politics and knowledge remain favoured topics 
of dispute in feminist criminology, just as they are in feminist philosophy (Tanesini 1999: 3). The 
distinctions here have been drawn between feminist empiricism, standpoint feminism and 
postmodern/poststructuralist feminisms (Punch 1998: 141-2). Feminist empiricism aims to correct the 
masculine bias of the methodologies of the human sciences, but accept its modernist claims that 
knowledge can be causal, certain, fixed and universal. Standpoint feminism rejects outright as 
masculinist traditional research methodologies and attempts to construct feminist ways of knowing 
based largely on experience (cf Stanley & Wise 1983, Grosz 1986). While postmodern/poststructuralist 
feminisms reject the epistemological assumptions of the enlightenment -- that truth can be impartial, 
ahistorical, acultural, singular, total or universal. These approaches tend to see knowledge as partial, 
uncertain and very much the product of power. They tend to opt for non-foundationalist, non-universalist 
ways of knowing which accept multiplicity and fallibility as defining characteristics of the episteme. This 
does not necessarily mean, however that all knowledge claims are relative and consequently equally 
valid. There are misrepresentations and methods of deconstructing these. More importantly there are 
better, more defensible and justified representations of events that occur in the social world and ways of 
researching and arguing these using methods informed by conceptual analysis, openness and critical 
reflection. 
 
While there is no single identifiable feminist approach to doing research, and much debate about what 
such a feminist approach may be (Gelsthorpe 1990: 90, Olsen 1994), there are however a number of 
distinguishing features which could be said to broadly characterise feminist approaches to crimino-legal 
research. First, feminist research methodologies question the neat separation of objectivity from 
subjectivity. Consequently they question the truth claims of legal and criminological research to be 
objective, devoid of interpretation and free from value judgement. They argue that such 'methods 
cannot convey an in depth understanding of, or feeling for those being researched and that they often 
ignore sex or gender differences or look at them without considering mediating variables' (Gelsthorpe 
1990: 90). The implication of this for feminist research in crimino-legal studies has manifested as a 
consistent preference for qualitative over quantitative, scientific or experimental methods. This 
preference, however, does not invalidate the use of quantitative methods in feminist research, for 
choice of method is largely a practical matter governed by the research topic at hand. So for example if 
the issue at hand relates to trends in women's participation in the workforce, or the gender dynamics of 
prison trends, then quantitative empirical tools which measure gender distribution in such settings would 
be justifiable. 
 
Second, for many feminist scholars the experience of doing research is just as important as the 
outcome. Questions about process and power are especially important. Some feminist researchers 
attempt to disentangle the exercise of power from the act of doing research by adopting reflexive 
methodologies. Their published accounts consciously reflect on the role of the researcher, the impact of 
subjectivity, the exercise of power, and the muddiness of the research process, often concealed in 
official research publications, such as those of the British Home Office (Davies 2000: 83, Byrne-
Armstrong et al 2001). Examples of feminist research in criminology that does just this can be found in 
the work of Pat Carlen, Pamela Davies, Lorraine Gelsthorpe, Lisa Maher, Kathryn Daly, Adriane Howe, 
and Ann Hudson to name a few.1  
 
Third, much feminist research assumes that knowledge is sexualised, that the history of the human 
sciences is a masculinised one and that feminist ways of knowing and doing research have been 
historically subjugated, repressed and disqualified (cf Grosz 1986, Harding 1987, Gunew 1990, Stanley 
& Wise 1983). Given this context it is understandable that the object of research for many feminist 
researchers in criminolegal studies has been to make visible the formerly invisible voices, knowledges, 
experiences and stories of women. For some (but by no means all) this has led to the adoption of 
feminist standpoint methodologies as an antidote to the phallocentrism of the human sciences. The 
choice of topic for these feminist researchers -- the study of women as gendered subjects -- then tends 
to follow logically -- as Hudson explains: 
 
The method of feminist standpoint criminology involves 'asking the woman question' -- that is asking 
how patterns of crime, penal policies, crime prevention and community safety strategies, ideologies of 
law and order, or indeed criminological theories affect women ... Feminist critical criminology 
exemplifies the traditional commitment of critical theory to acknowledging standpoints and having 
political/practical as well as theoretical objectives (Hudson 2000: 185). 
 
There has been, however, much internal debate in the field of feminist crimino-legal studies about the 
virtues and limitations of such a methodology (Cain 1986, Smart 1989, Carrington 2002). One 
inescapable problem for feminist standpoint methodologies is the essentialism that flows from the 
epistemological equation between women's experience and knowledge (Harris 1990). As women are 
differentiated in relation to the operation of the legal process, feminist standpoint methodologies which 
assume a commonality (or fixed essence) among women, and a universal subjectivity among men, run 
the risk of constructing fictive unities among cohorts of legal subjects whose statuses before the law are 
quite diverse. So for instance women who are vulnerable to criminalisation for petty crimes (such as 
social security fraud) share very little in common with the overwhelming majority of women who never 
come into contact with the criminal process. Most women are insulated from its direct power effects. 
Those who are not tend to come from housing commission, Aboriginal and other poor neighbourhoods 
as studies of female offending have repeatedly shown (cf Carlen 1988, Carrington 1993, Chesney-Lind 
& Sheldon 1998, Daly 1994, Gelsthorpe 1989, Maher 1997). So there is no essential female subject of 
law to be 'discovered' or 'uncovered' through standpoint methodologies. 
 
The critique of feminist standpoint methodology has called for a different kind of feminist intellectual 
engagement with crimino-legal knowledges to the one that totalises conceptions of law and criminal 
 justice, attributing to them a false unity of purpose. There are healthy signs of this occurring. Many 
feminists working broadly in the field of crimino-legal studies have become much more aware of the 
effects of race and ethnicity which many had once ignored (see Hahn Rafter & Heidensohn 1995, Rice 
1990). Feminists are also working overtly to correct their former tendencies to essentialise masculinity 
and femininity -- by demonising one and romanticising the other; and much contemporary feminist 
research has displaced its once essentialist focus on gender, to analyse how a complex tapestry of 
racial, colonial, gender and class inequalities intersect to position women differently in relation to the 
operation of criminal justice and law (cf Graycar 1995, Daly 1994, Mayer 1997, Thornton 1995). This is 
especially the case with Indigenous women and girls in countries like Canada and Australia who are 
massively over-represented before the courts and in our prisons and figure disproportionately as victims 
of crime as well. 
 
While disputes about the nature of knowledge remain unsettled, there is, however, a broad consensus 
that feminist scholarship is avowedly both a 'political and intellectual' enterprise (Naffine 1995: 28). My 
own research, while not singularly feminist in approach or choice of topic, has nevertheless been 
strongly influenced by feminism. Like Lorraine Gelsthorpe 'I cannot separate a feminist and nonfeminist 
me. Therefore the way in which I conducted the research had as much to do with my collective 
experiences -- as a researcher, as a woman, as someone with a particular history -- as well as to any 
specific elements of feminism' (Gelsthorpe 1990: 98). Here it is pertinent to acknowledge that the 
legacy of Michel Foucault, especially his approach to method, his conceptualisation of power and 
knowledge, and his prognosis for the role of the specific intellectual (Foucault 1981, 1991) has had 
obvious influences over my approach to doing research. But not solely either. The robust tradition of 
critical criminology which connects academic projects to political projects is clearly apparent in my 
choice of what to research, though not necessarily how (Carrington & Hogg 2002). This influence has 
been most evident in my genealogy as Chairperson for Academics for Justice and practical involvement 
in campaigns to correct miscarriages of justice (see Carrington et al 1991). These multiple influences 
intertwined when nearly a decade ago now I commenced a piece of research into the representations of 
sexuality in the Leigh Leigh rape/murder case. What follows is a reflective analysis of how many years 
later this research was 'discredited' as 'absolute rubbish' through adversarial methods for producing 
narrative closure peculiarly available only to those who have the sovereign power of law at their 
disposal. 
 
The Crime, My Research & its Genealogy 
  
According to a large number of police witness statements which I read during the course of conducting 
this research, on the night of the 3rd November 1989, 14-year-old Leigh Leigh was subjected to a 
series of degrading taunts, assaults and sexual assaults before being strangled, bashed and 
bludgeoned to death with a large rock. She had been attending a beach party on the Stockton coast 
line about 200 kilometres north from Sydney. Of a large number of boys involved in spitting upon, 
assaulting and otherwise degrading the victim shortly before her death, only one was charged with 
assault, and another with carnal knowledge (not rape), although she, and others present, had claimed 
he had raped her. No-one has ever been prosecuted for Leigh Leigh's rape, despite serious genital 
injuries that one forensic scientist described as most likely to have been inflicted by an inflexible object 
like a broken bottle. 
 
I did not set out to 'unearth' or 'uncover' any hidden, master or singular 'truth' about this crime, nor to 
produce any definitive account about it, but to demonstrate how this event, like all events, is subject to 
multiple discursive readings, re-readings and representations some of which are more or less accurate 
than others, but how some are the products of 'legal fictions'. For instance, immediately following the 
discovery of Leigh's naked body the crime was widely and unambiguously reported as a brutal sex 
crime.2 Three months later, however, when Matthew Webster, an 18-year-old working class boy from 
Stockton was charged with her murder and sexual assault after 'confessing' to it in a police interview 
using the tried old tactics of custodial interrogation, the crime underwent a curious discursive 
reconstruction. Building up to and following Webster's conviction, the crime became increasingly 
sanitised as a murder involving a callous and brutal bashing,3 with virtually no reference to the vicious 
sexual assault that preceded the victim's death. Only much, much later did it become apparent that the 
original charge of sexual assault was dropped during only what can be assumed was a plea-bargaining 
process. Because Matthew Webster pleaded guilty there was no trial or testing of 'the facts'. The 
detective who composed this set of facts gave evidence during the 1998/9 PIC hearings that when it 
became apparent Webster was to plead guilty, the sentence hearing adjourned and he was instructed 
to rewrite 'the facts'. An agreed set of 'facts' was then tendered during the sentence hearing that 
described an earlier sexual assault upon Leigh Leigh that night quite remarkably as 'her act of 
intercourse' making no reference whatsoever to the forensic evidence of the seriousness of the injuries 
to her genitalia. 
 
Throughout the successive discursive reconstructions of this crime produced by the legal process, the 
discourses of guilt became so thoroughly and mercilessly inverted that Matthew Webster, the self-
confessed killer, came to be represented in the press 4 and the judge's comments upon sentence (R v 
Webster) as a 'gentle giant', an unfortunate victim of 'uncharacteristic and impulsive ferocity whilst 
disinhibited by alcohol and drugs'. Quoting from a psychologists report, the sentencing comments 
referred to Leigh Leigh as a 'slut'. Meanwhile the consumption of drugs and alcohol, sexual promiscuity 
(not sexual violence) and lack of parental supervision came to be represented as the major factors 
underlying her murder. The sexuality of her killer and the conduct of other boys at the party that night, 
attracted little judicial criticism or public comment. This was just one of the many re-tellings of this event 
which was to offend the virtue of the victim and feed into wider discursive reconstructions that Leigh 
Leigh was a slut who deserved what she got. 
 
A quite remarkable silencing occurred. Representations of the crime as a heinous act of sexual violence 
were almost completely expunged from public discourse.5 My research began as an interrogation of 
how that silencing occurred and its complex multifarious power effects. I initially learnt about these 
discursive reconstructions from some of Leigh Leigh's former school peers who by sheer coincidence 
were enrolled in a subject called 'Youth Culture and Delinquency', which I taught with Andrew Johnson 
at the University of Newcastle. Andrew and I became interested in a series of wider cultural and 
criminological questions about how the discursive reconstructions of this crime were overlayed by a 
local Novocastrian culture which seemed to exhibit a high level of tolerance for sexual violence among 
its adolescent population. We were interested in how this culture overlapped with the local surfing 
culture, the occupational culture of the BHP steel-works, and the notorious hard-edged working class 
culture of the city. I applied for a small university grant to conduct a study of sexuality, adolescence and 
popular culture in Newcastle. Andrew worked as the research assistant on the project. We began by 
retrieving the media clippings relating to the Leigh Leigh case and other cases like it, both locally and 
nationally, and interviewing those who had known her. 
 
I gave my first academic conference paper about the case in December 1993 at a Law and Society 
Conference convened by the Macquarie University Law School. A small article published in The 
Newcastle Herald described the research (Newcastle Herald 3 January 1994). This prompted Leigh 
Leigh's relatives to contact me. The first to make contact was Robyn Leigh who wrote: 
 
I am the mother of Leigh Leigh ... The way the police handled the whole case sickens me ... I 
have written to anyone I could think who could help me. But all the politicians, police, 
Ombudsman, Commissioner for Human Rights all ignored my pleas for help. ... People forget 
Leigh was the victim not the boys, Stockton or the kids at the party but Leigh ... I have a court 
case coming up soon and am praying to anyone who will listen to the truth on what really 
happened that night. ... I thank you from my heart for speaking out on Leigh's behalf. Yours 
sincerely, R. Leigh. 
 
I was to disappoint Mrs Leigh, for nor could I deliver any definitive account of the 'truth' of what 
happened that night. But I could deconstruct and problematise the one which was widely circulated 
following Webster's sentencing that reconstructed him as a victim, and her daughter Leigh as a 'slut'. 
Later I was contacted by Toni Maunsell, Leigh's aunt, and over the next few years I had met nearly 
every one in Leigh's extended maternal family, from great grandmother, grandmother, two aunts, and 
several cousins. Toni and I have maintained a close relationship since, and somewhat ironically she 
later became one of my strongest supports throughout my ordeal with the Police Integrity Commission. 
But at the time it was Robyn Leigh's personal plea that spurred my deeper involvement and continuing 
research into the case after the initial conference paper. Without her support at that time my 
involvement would have ended then and there. As a specific intellectual with privileged access to the 
institutions that produce regimes of truth, I somewhat naively felt a responsibility to contest the 
production of a number of legal fictions associated with the case. I arranged for Academics for Justice, 
a loose knit group of academics that challenged specific instances of injustice, to fund Mrs Leigh's 
appeal against her victim's compensation case. I introduced her to a new lawyer from the Newcastle 
Legal Centre, attached to the university, to act for her in the matter. I arranged for a number of fresh 
forensic opinions to be sought on the autopsy report and other materials. In August 1994, on behalf of 
Mrs Leigh I prepared a submission to the NSW Royal Commission into Police Corruption, headed by 
Justice Wood, the same judge who sentenced Matthew Webster. It all came to naught basically (for a 
detailed account see Carrington 1998). 
 
Law, Science & Phallocentrism vs Critical Criminology, Deconstructionism & Feminism 
  
In what follows I reflect on how my research into this case was subsequently disqualified very publicly 
and at great expense, funded by the tax-payer, by special hearings of the New South Wales Police 
Integrity Commission, a body that has standing royal commission powers and chose to use them 
against me for reasons that are still unclear and later became a matter of considerable dispute and 
litigation. My reflections are not purposely self-indulgent, but designed to illustrate how the assumed 
alignment between law, justice, science and truth operates to privilege phallocentric ways of knowing 
while disqualifying other ways of knowing and forms of representation. This is important 
methodologically, as I believe there are critical lessons here for the future of feminist research in 
crimino-legal studies. 
 
In January 1999 I was summoned to appear before the PIC with a week's notice and no choice about 
whether to appear. I was given no specific reason for being summonsed and what I was told by the PIC 
investigator who delivered the subpoena turned out to be misleading. Whether intentional or not, the 
PIC hearings appeared to many onlookers as designed to simply discredit me as a long-time critic of 
the legal system's handling of the case having published three academic articles about the case 
(Carrington & Johnson 1994, 1995, Carrington 1995) and a book tendered into evidence as Exhibit 72. 
Under summons I was cross-examined for three days by eight different legal counsel, longer than any 
other witness, and much longer than most of the police called to account for alleged misconduct before 
these hearings. The PIC is an enormously powerful public agency. At the same time it is exempt from 
many of the measures of accountability that generally apply to the public sector, including Freedom of 
Information and Privacy legislation.6 The sole mechanism of accountability appears to be the PIC 
Inspectorate. Yet the oversight functions of the PIC Inspectorate are vastly inadequate.7  
 
The strategy pursued in cross-examination was to assert the authority of science as the only valid 
candidate for knowledge and the scientific method as the only valid method of academic research, and 
ultimately to align law with science and truth. I was maligned by being associated with all that was 
neither scientific nor legalistic. One of the rhetorical strategies of law is to insist on universal and 
singular definitions that disqualify alternative definitions (Goodrich 1986). My cross-examiner sought to 
do just that in this exchange: 
 
Q. And would you agree with this short definition of criminology, that it means, in effect, the 
scientific study of crime? 
  
A. There are different paradigms within criminologists' [sic] thinking, and that's one of them. 
  
... 
  
Q. Can we agree that, whatever the various definitions may be, one of them would be the 
scientific study of crime? 
  
A. That's a positives [sic] criminologist's form of thinking and it's actually one to which I don't 
subscribe and in fact its one that contested in the criminologists' [sic] literature. 
  
Q. Yes, but can you see scope for the scientific study of crime? 
  
A. Criminological positives [sic] certainly do. 
  
Q. Yes, and you would accept that people who adopt that definition would be carrying out, in a 
practical sense or a professional sense, a scientific study of crime -- doing their job properly, I 
mean, as a professional? 
  
A. There are different approaches to criminologist's [sic] knowledge. As I explained, there are 
those who subscribe to the scientific paradigm and those who don't. Those who don't, there are 
post-structural criminologists, like myself. There are scientifically based -- there are a wide variety 
of criminologists [sic] approaches and paradigms, and I do not subscribe to the one which what 
we criminologists call positivism. 
  
Q. I don't want to really spend a great deal of time on this, madam, but in a real sense, albeit a 
loose definition, it nonetheless includes, if you like, the scientific study of crime? 
  
A. One particular criminological paradigm includes that, but it's a highly contested area 
  
(Police Integrity Commission Transcripts, Operation Belfast [hereafter PIC Transcripts] 8 
February 1999: 1511-2). 
 
My attempts to persuade my interrogator of the validity of multiple criminological paradigms went 
unheeded. The discursive battleground between critical theory and the power of law to define superior 
knowledge was fore-grounded in this exchange. The cross-examination continued in such a way as to 
assert the authority of his definition, as 'the scientific study of crime' and then to align the 'proper' and 
'professional' study of criminology with criminological positivism. The next tactic was to equate rigour 
and objectivity with facts, truth, and science, and to align me with all that was not ... 
 
Q. Well, would you agree that, whatever the paradigms may be, a professional, an academic -- 
especially a person with your background and qualifications -- would bring intellectual rigour to 
any study or any examination just as part of being a professional? 
  
A. Yes, and rigour doesn't necessarily equate with science. 
  
Q. But in the way I use it, intellectual rigour would mean, surely trying to arrive at the truth based 
on proper facts, properly obtained? 
  
A. Well if you're a Foucaultian you actually believe that there is no such thing as absolute truth; 
that all truths are partial; that they are contextual; that, in fact, the complete and whole truth is 
something that none of us are able to access. All we can access is the best possible picture of 
truth. 
  
Q. Well, can you see a situation where intellectual rigour would be consistent with an objective 
approach to a matter? 
  
A. No. That's something of a highly contested nature within the literature as well. ... (PIC 
Transcripts 8 February 1999: 1512). 
 
Once again the rhetorical strategy was to invalidate my answers, to disallow contested meaning, and to 
continue the same line of questioning as if my responses were either not heard or the meaningless 
utterances of someone operating outside the scientific paradigm. Terry Threadgold articulates with 
great clarity the context of the discursive battle between feminist crimino-legal research and traditional 
legal method which at that moment I found myself enmeshed: 
 
Plurality and difference is accepted in these theories (that is in critical theory) as 'normal', not as 
something pathological, threatening, other to be controlled and contained, overcome. ... This is a 
different story to the one that law tells about itself. The Law is an interpretative community with a 
complex intertextual history which has always worked with a view of language that is 'realist' or 
'referential'. This is a view of language that has always argued, in the face of all the evidence to 
the contrary, that meaning inhere in words, that there is a 'true' meaning or intention to be  
recovered from language, that language is a kind of container for meanings which it transmits 
unproblematically from sender to receiver ... (1993: 15). 
 
Predictably, the cross-examination continued to equate professionalism with pure objectivity -- the 
centre-piece of the myth of judicial neutrality. Objectivity, or more specifically knowledge claims of this 
status, have similar resonances within the familiar rhetoric of scientific positivism. 
 
Q. And because you are a professional, you would try to exclude from professionalism and from 
that study any personal philosophies bias or personal views, if you possibly can, as a 
professional? 
 
A. Well, that's only if you subscribe to criminologists [sic] positivism and, as I've said, that's a 
particular paradigm and certainly not one to which I subscribe. There are a whole stack of 
feminist criminologist [sic] that in fact say what's disqualified from those paradigms is 
experiences. There are other voices, which are outside of all that, and they actually assert that 
personal experience and subjectivity and the position and standpoint are very, very important in 
producing and generating knowledge, and that knowledge can have valid claims as well. 
  
Q. Madam, I'm not talking about philosophies, I'm talking about ideals. I'm talking about a factual 
scenario, factual matrix, having in mind the Leigh Leigh murder. Do you understand what I mean 
by that -- that is, the investigation and the events leading up to that investigation, and what 
occurred after that investigation took place. Do you understand? 
  
A. I understand you now to be talking about a specific case, and that your [sic] presenting it in 
terms of a legal scenario and not a criminological one (PIC Transcripts 8 February 1999: 1512-3). 
 
Whenever I gave an answer that upset the flow of his discrediting tactics, the cross-examiner tended to 
shift the goal posts. As the one being questioned, I lacked the formal power he had to realign the 
discursive battle ground. A fundamental feature of cross-examination is the structural inequality 
between the interrogator and the interrogated. 'The power of law's right to question is unquestioned, the 
questioning of the question by the "witness" is not permissible within the monologic framework of the 
legal method which refuses to allow itself to be questioned' (Byrne-Armstrong et al 1999: 33). The 
discursive rule which creates this profoundly unequal exercise of power was reiterated several times 
during my time in the box. The power effects of this asymmetrical discursive field is a central theme to 
which I return in the following section. A debate over the nature of 'facts' ensued, but it did not turn out 
to be an enlightening dialogue between mutually respectful colleagues. 
 
Q. ... I put to you that there is no room for academic constructions, ideological constructions or 
philosophical constructions in relation to the fact, and the way you have dealt with it, in the 
context in which you have just read there, is a philosophical view isn't it? 
  
I replied: 
 
There is -- facts in an academic world are always mediated by discourses; facts are always open 
to interpretation, facts, whilst, as much as possible -- (PIC Transcripts 8 February 1999: 1530). 
 
At that point, my interrogator interrupted, my QC objected to his interruption, the Commissioner 
intervened, and I was finally allowed to finish: 
 
Academic writings and literature and criminological theories; facts, are important to them -- of 
course they are -- but so are ideas, so are theories, philosophies, so are other forms of 
knowledge, and some of those may not be readily factually verifiable, but that doesn't mean that 
they are invalid (1531). 
 
Once again my answers went unheard. The cross-examination belligerently went on to assert the 
singular authority of law to produce incontestable 'truth' and 'facts' about cases, and to highlight my 
absence of formal legal credentials as a way of discrediting anything I may have to say about the Leigh 
Leigh case, or indeed any other. My defence of a critical criminology against positivist criminology was 
taken as a discrediting negative, my defence of feminist methodologies as a 'signifier' of bias and 
subjectivism and my attempt at being a specific intellectual by contesting the localised hegemony of the 
'truths' produced in the Leigh Leigh case was discredited on the basis that I was not a lawyer and 
consequently not entitled to offer valid criticism of this, or any other, case processed by the legal 
process. I was defined as an outsider who had crossed law's jealously guarded boundaries by using 
such precious words as 'case', 'prima facie' and 'evidence' (cf PIC Transcripts 9 February 1999: 1574-9, 
and 1595 especially). My attempts to contest the sole authority of law to produce infallible 'truths' were 
berated in ways like: 'Madam, that is rubbish, what you're putting now . . .' (1576). 
 
At that moment my cross-examiner could not comprehend how I could accept that the failure to 
prosecute anyone for Leigh's rape may have been 'legally correct' (1579) but simultaneously hold the 
view that 'I still can't -- and I'm not alone -- accept it was justice to Leigh, that no-one was ever 
prosecuted for her rape' (1580). I was operating across the boundaries of multiple epistemologies, and 
can accept that 'truths' are constructed in a variety of ways. He however was operating from the basis 
of one singular epistemology that beholds the law as the Master of Truth. Within the narrow episteme of 
the legal method operating in these hearings, law is justice so my response to his disbelief: 'Because 
the law doesn't necessarily equate with justice' (1580) was incomprehensible. 
 
A little later I had the opportunity to repeat the point more forcefully: 'In the book I actually say it's legally 
technically correct ... I can understand it at a pragmatic level. However that doesn't make it just, doesn't 
make it right' (1588). I made the 'mistake' of saying at one point that I could comprehend it intellectually 
but could not accept it emotionally as a just outcome (1579). My research, my criticisms and my 
motives were then discursively reconstructed, as simply 'emotional'. Some media outlets broadcast this 
discrediting narrative with considerable enthusiasm (ABC News Reports 8 February 1999, 9 February 
1999). 
 
I went on to explain that as a criminologist: 'I have a very specific interest in sexual violence. One in four 
victims of sexual violence report to the police. Of those who do report -- nine out of ten ... do not receive 
justice, and most of them perceive the legal process as a process of them being doubly victimised, 
persecuted and victimised again' (1594). In an attempt to redraw the boundaries my cross-examiner 
sought to insist 'but the major concerns of this inquiry are the allegations you made in a legal context, 
not a criminological context' (1595). I had not made any allegations of police corruption in any legal 
context. Like so many others,8 I had criticised the police investigation and the handling of this case by 
the justice system, and its representation in the media in the traditions of the public intellectual. These 
criticisms were reconstituted in the legal language before the hearings as 'allegations'. The concerns 
upon which I had been cross-examined related to media interviews, public discourse over which this 
hearing was seeking to redefine as 'legal context' for its own narrowly constituted purposes of 
containment, of bringing me inside its boundaries to be subject to law's powers. I interpreted this as a 
form of 'legal imperialism' (Smart 1989: 13) -- as a strategy to redefine the boundaries of law to contest 
the public discourse about this case, by seeking to discredit one of its major critics. So I answered 'No. 
They (journalists) introduced me always as a criminologist. They don't say "Here's lawyer Kerry 
Carrington."' To which he retorted, 'What your [sic] saying now is absolute nonsense ...' (PIC 
Transcripts 9 February 1999: 1595). I drew his attention to the analogy of anthropologists studying other 
cultures to explain my research in feminist-crimino-legal studies, concluding 
 
See I am not a lawyer, but what is so wrong about somebody who is not a lawyer studying the 
legal process of its effects or its wider patterns? What is wrong about that? What crime have I 
committed here (1595)? 
 
My attempts at dialogue were futile. No matter what I said it didn't much matter anyway. My lack of 
formal legal credentials, my refusal to defer to the hegemony of law to produce singular infallible truths, 
and my acknowledgment of the role of discourse, power, experience, subjectivity and emotion in the 
production and interpretation of 'facts' had me 'condemned' to the realm of 'absolute rubbish'. 
 
The discrediting narrative did not end here. After having 'admitted' I held criminological concerns about 
the treatment of sexual assault complainants I was positioned in the box as rape complainants often 
are: as hysterical fantasisers who fabricate allegations of sexual assault (cf Mason 1995, Young 1998). 
This was the image my cross-examiners sought to create of me, using similar bully boy cross-
examination techniques, that exaggerate or misrepresent what has just been said or done to insinuate 
almost the opposite to what was intended. Just as the credibility of the victim is the central site of attack 
in rape cases (Smart 1989, Young 1998), so too was mine. Using the same discursive devices used to 
routinely discredit the victims of sexual assault, I was subject to a barrage of accusations and loaded 
insinuations. Instances of where this occurred during my three-day interrogation are not hard to find 
(see also Byrne-Armstrong et al 1999 for a detailed analysis of these discursive battles). I was accused 
of being emotional (PIC Transcripts 9 February 1999: 1583); of being ignorant (1586); of publishing 
'absolute rubbish' (8 February 1999: 1532); of manufacturing controversial allegations to sell a book 
(1536); of being a hypocrite (9 February 1999: 1627); of making things up to 'protect' my 'incompetence' 
(8 February 1999: 1546); and of lying under oath (9 February 1999: 1638). 
 
Denials to these attacks on my credibility were silenced by the drum of the 'brisk and authoritative' 
narrative of my cross-examiners, as is common in sexual assault cases (Young 1999: 458). I was 
repeatedly instructed to say only yes or no (i.e. PIC Transcripts 8 February 1999: 1462-9). The 
accumulative effect of such strategies amounts, as Alison Young suggests, to an asymmetry of power 
in legal discourse (1999: 460). The asymmetry was not difficult to detect. In just the physical 
surroundings of the hearings alone it looked like a David and Goliath line up -- with the Commissioner's 
gaze peering down upon me from a great height while my gaze was mostly fixed upon two rows of 
grimacing dark-suited men (and one silk-suited woman) lined up like a pack of wolves, impatiently 
waiting their turn to pounce. I had the added humiliating experience of having to use a male toilet 
overseen by a male 'guard' to the side of the PIC hearing room. I experienced first-hand how the micro-
physics of power (a concept obviously borrowed from Foucault) can have profound effects not only on 
the production of subjectified/objectified bodies, but on the production of 'truth' to which I now turn. 
 
Coercing the 'Truth' 
  
The principle aim of the adversarial legal method is the same as scientific positivism: to produce 
'incontestable truths' and impose unitary meanings. As Goodrich argues, it does this through a number 
of mechanisms: by privileging the voice of the judicial author 'as the supreme arbiter of meaning'; by 
precluding dialogue, by producing fictive 'closures', and employing 'distancing devices' (1986: 189), by 
invoking 'devices of exclusion' (1986: 191), by asserting the sovereignty of law and the 'objectivity of its 
methods' and by refuting the need to justify its rationale outside any narrowly constructed episteme 
which assumes a self-righteous correctness. While all of these were invoked in some way or another 
during the hearing, to this list of coercive devices, in my case, one can add the mockery of those who 
dare think otherwise. Here are just a few examples: 
 
Q. Madam, you are an Associate Professor, aren't you? I don't mean to be facetious, but you are 
an Associate Professor? ... 
 
Q. With a full understanding of the English language; correct (PIC Transcripts 8 February 1999: 
1528)? 
  
Q. You don't have to know the name of the present Pope to realise there [is] a Pope in Rome, do 
you? Do you (1546)? 
 
My initial refusal to obey the coerciveness of the discursive rules of this hearing met with the following 
ridicule by my cross-examiner: 
 
Madam do you understand the word 'yes', and do you understand the word, 'no' (1465)? 
 
At that point Commissioner Urquhart intervened, not to castigate my cross-examiner's rudeness, but to 
demand that I obey the unequal discursive rules of his hearing room. My challenge to these rules was 
taken as 'evidence' of an uncooperative witness, and I was subject to the following scolding. 
 
Q. Associate Professor, I'll just say something to you about why you are here? 
  
A. Certainly, sir. 
 
Q. You are not here to defend your book. You are here to answer questions. ... Not the question 
you would like to have been asked, but the question you are asked ... it is important that we 
proceed on the basis that questions are asked to elicit evidence. 
  
A. Yes, sir (1465). 
 
In this exchange, I was coerced into deference -- to obey the sovereign power of law. The voice of the 
judicial author was vastly privileged over mine. I was only there to answer questions, not to contest the 
assumptions underpinning questions loaded with contestable meaning and innuendo. I was not allowed 
to contest the litany of abusive attacks on my academic professionalism, personal credibility and 
integrity. When I defied the regime of rules governing this adversarial monologue the Commissioner 
reminded me of his sovereign powers of coercion. For instance: 
 
... You have to understand, no matter how much you might want to defend your book or anything 
else for that matter, that you're here to answer the questions that I allow to be asked of you, and 
to answer that question only (1470). 
 
Another strategy deployed by the legal method for setting itself up as the privileged bastion of 'truth' to 
which Goodrich (1986) refers, is by denying that words can have contested, multiple or different 
meanings. For example, at one stage under cross-examination I was attacked by legal counsel for the 
police for using the term 'investigate' in my book to describe my intellectual endeavours into the Leigh 
Leigh case, which he took to mean as only having a singular uniform definition -- a police investigation. I 
responded by saying: 
 
Investigate, but not in the sense of how police would investigate, in the sense of how an 
academic would investigate it. 
 
To which he retorted: 
 
Why didn't you say that then and there so you would not mislead any reader, they could send the 
book back or get a refund (1515). 
 
At that point my legal counsel objected and so did the public gallery which erupted spontaneously with 
sighs of disbelief and disgust. The Commissioner told my QC to sit down and then berated the public 
gallery, reminding them of his powers of coercion. 
 
The people who are in the public gallery are here by invitation. I will revoke that invitation and I 
will send you outside. ... I will brook no interference with the conduct of this hearing. I haven't 
raised my voice but that doesn't indicate it's not serious. It is (1516). 
 
This was not the last time he threatened the gallery (among them Leigh's relatives and my supporters, 
mostly tame academics aghast at the coerciveness of the attack upon the values of academic freedom 
and criticism) with eviction from his hearing. 
 
The next time somebody speaks like that, that person will be excluded for the whole of this 
hearing. I've spoken before about that. I don't want to speak about it again (1536). 
 
Well he did. At the end of this particular day Commissioner Urquhart issued a general threat of 
prosecution for contempt to the gallery: 
 
To those in the public gallery who, whether it be by reflection or whether it be a contrived 
situation or otherwise, wish to present some sound effects, some off-stage comments, call them 
what you like, I hear them, but I do nothing with them other than regard them as providing the 
potential for me to consider that those who are doing that may be committing contempt of this 
Commission, and that's an offence (1548). 
 
Docility and compliance was being commanded not through mutual respect, persuasion, dialogue or 
understanding, but through the threat of coercion (Goodrich 1986: 194). Like the way the scientific 
method establishes its own internal episteme for what counts as valid candidates for truth, the legal 
method evoked throughout this hearing established its own internal parameters for what counted as 
valid and then sought to exclude, discredit and disqualify any alternative definitions or views. The logic 
of this legal method, quite apart from its insularity, is discernibly 'indivisible from the exercise of power' 
(Smart 1989: 11). In this respect Foucault's observation published nearly two decades ago is still all too 
relevant: 
 
Truth isn't outside power, or lacking in power ... truth isn't the reward of free spirits, the child of 
protracted solitude, not the privilege of those who have succeeded in liberating themselves. Truth 
is a thing of this world: it is produced only by virtue of multiple forms of constraint. And it induces 
regular effects of power (Foucault in Rabinow 1984: 72-3). 
 
What makes the discursive rules of this hearing look even more like the arbitrary exercise of coercive 
power is that the Police Integrity Commission Act section 20(2) requires the Commission to 'exercise its 
functions with as little formality and technicality as possible ... [and to conduct] hearings ... with as little 
emphasis on an adversarial approach as is possible'. In addition to this the Police Integrity Commission 
Code of Conduct requires that the business of the Commission be conducted with 'efficiency' and 
'economy' (as well as fairness, impartiality and integrity) and that its officers should 'strive to attain value 
for money and avoid waste in the use of public resources'. Public hearings (with legal representation for 
all concerned) are the most expensive, formal, technical and (as permitted by the Commissioner in this 
instance) adversarial method for the Commission to conduct its business and yet this is the method it 
chose with respect to most of the matters involving myself. I am still puzzled as to why. I was not a 
police officer accused of any corruption. Yet I was made to feel very much throughout this ordeal as if I 
had committed some 'heinous' crime, prompting me to ask near the end of my three days in the witness 
box: 'I have criticised the police and where is the crime in criticising the police? What crime have I 
committed?' (PIC Transcripts 9 February 1999: 1626). 
 
Unlike any court hearing, I was not accused of anything in any formal legal sense. This was not a trial, 
and I was not supposed to be on trial. But the regular effects of power produced by the unequal 
resources and strategies available to me when pitted against an almighty powerful institution such as 
the PIC, made it feel like a trial, like a witch-hunt. So what were my 'crimes'? Upon reflection there are 
probably many not the least of which: having the 'audacity' to contest the reversal of the discourses of 
blame in the Leigh Leigh case; to challenge the legal representations dispersed in public culture which 
had brought this case to an unsatisfactory 'closure' for Leigh's relatives, friends and supporters -- to 
cross law's jealously guarded boundaries as the only valid source of 'truth' on such matters -- and to 
publicly challenge the phallocentrism of the way the legal process routinely disqualifies the victims of 
sexual assault by subjecting them to masculinist reconstructions of their conduct as somehow having 
deserved what they got. To these I have now, in publishing this piece, committed another sin -- the 
refusal to be silenced -- yet another discrediting signifier of the influence of feminism, not law, on the 
production of my politics and subjectivity. For this I make no apology should this offend those who 
would defensively seek to uphold the self-righteousness of law's power to command universal 
obedience and deference through whatever tactics are at its privileged disposal. My bitter experience 
with the PIC has left me wondering about the future of feminist research in crimino-legal studies. 
 
The Future of Feminist Research in Crimino-legal Studies 
  
Feminist research poses a profound challenge to the hegemony of law's claims to produce 
incontestable universal truths. It does this by exposing the masculinist biases of the law and science, 
and along with it the myth of judicial neutrality (cf Graycar 1995). The sheer weight of historical 
evidence of the gender bias of the judiciary, suggests that law, despite its claims to neutrality, objectivity 
and reason -- simply cannot be impartial. 'The voice of law and legal practice is "male", although this 
voice is construed as representing a gender-neutral stance' (Daly 1989: 1). Feminist legal theorists 
argue that the legal subject, although now formally inclusive of women, remains a man and not a 
woman, because there has been no concomitant endeavour to rethink the defining characteristics of 
law's subject (Naffine 1995: 29). Women's differences, which may require their specific protection (i.e. 
such as the provision of female toilets and female guards in hearing rooms), are not afforded that 
protection. Much legal reasoning is consequently based implicitly on masculine norms, from which it 
should be no surprise that women measure as deviant. Their differences are then sign-posted as 
deficiencies in character, credibility and so on. She is Othered (Kirkby 1995: xviii). Nowhere is this more 
apparent than in the way the sexual assault complainant is positioned in a way to silence, discredit and 
impugn her, through damaging insinuations about her character and motive (Young 1998: 444-5). 
These rhetorical strategies of legal discourse are overlayed by a narrative of gendered legal constructs 
that purport to represent a universal truth, 'yet negate women's understandings of reality and which 
make no genuine attempt to incorporate the differences between women's subjectivities' (Mason 1995: 
66). So despite the increasing presence of women in the legal profession, 'legal doctrines and legal 
reasoning appear to have remained almost completely impervious to perspectives other than those of 
the (dominant) White, middle-class male' (Graycar 1995: 267). Feminist challenges to law's definitions 
and boundaries are invariably dismissed as irrelevant, nonsensical or 'absolute rubbish' just as mine 
were. Little wonder the legal method has been described as impervious to feminist challenge (Mosman 
1986), making for a grim, but all the more important, future for feminist research in crimino-legal studies. 
 
Feminist challenges to phallocentric constructions of legal knowledge present a profound threat to law's 
claims to produce impartial 'truth' precisely because they operate within a concrete field of specificity 
rather than at a level of comfortable abstraction more readily confined to the cupboard as an 
irrelevance, annoyance or barely noticeable distraction. That the personal is political disrupts the basis 
of law's claims to being able to produce incontestable universal truths. There are risks, however, in 
being too concretely visible in challenging the production of legal fictions. For those who dare question 
the authority of law's truth claims to accurately 'represent reality', my experience is a timely reminder 
that the sovereign power of law will jealously guard its monopoly to do so, coercively if necessary. For 
feminists conducting research in the field of crimino-legal studies this problem may become even more 
pressing in a higher education climate where academic freedom, independence and legitimacy to 
conduct research critical of privileged judicial voices, dominant institutions and practices is becoming 
less and less institutionally supported.9  
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Footnotes 
 
1 Davies provides a detailed reflexive account of her experience of doing qualitative research with 
female offenders. Her account emphasises just how much the act of doing research entails continuous 
decision-making (Davies 2000: 84) and argues good research rejects the traditional hierarchical 
relationship between the researcher and the researched. Gelsthorpe too provides a detailed reflexive 
account of her research in prisons, the effect of her age, gender and the role of power in doing 
ethnographic/qualitative research in such a setting (Gelsthorpe 1990: 94-9). 
 
2 For example: 'The girl's battered and sexually assaulted body was found on Sunday morning ... Police 
believe Leigh was raped several times and that more than one person was involved' (Sydney Morning 
Herald 8 November 1989: 4); 'the brutal rape and murder of 14-year-old school girl ... Leigh was raped 
several times in what police said could have been a gang rape' (Sydney Morning Herald 7 November 
1989: 1); 'the girl was sexually assaulted and strangled before being killed' (Sun-Herald 5 November 
1989: 7); 'Leigh was raped and murdered' (Sun-Herald 12 November 1989: 32); 'police believed that 
14-year-old Leigh had been sexually assaulted before being brutally bludgeoned to death with a rock' 
(Newcastle Herald 6 November 1989: 1); 'Police were now working on the theory that the young girl had 
been sexually assaulted by more than one persons and that more than one person may have been 
involved in her murder' (Newcastle Herald 7 November 1989: 1). 
 
3 For example, 'Rock Thrown to Slay Girl on Dunes, Court Told' (Newcastle Herald 20 February 1990: 
1); 'Man Showed where Leigh Died, Court Told' (Newcastle Herald 24 May 1990); 'bashing murder' 
(Newcastle Herald 23 October 1990: 1); 'Leigh murder admitted' (Newcastle Herald 23 May 1990: 1); 
'Teenager guilty of Leigh Murder' (Newcastle Herald 23 October 1990: 1); 'the brutal murder of 14-year-
old school girl Leigh at Stockton last year, shocked the country' (Newcastle Herald 1 November 1990: 
9). 
 
4 'Why Stockton's "gentle giant" will not get a life sentence' (Newcastle Herald 23 October 1990). See 
also Sydney Morning Herald 23 October 1990: 3, last paragraph. 
 
5 There were two significant exceptions: Adele Horin 'Murder exposes cultural bogies' (Sydney Morning 
Herald 6 November 1993); Catherine Lumby 'Group rape: a crime that's far from rare' (Sydney Morning 
Herald 9 November 1993: 3). 
 
6 For instance, during one of the confidential PIC Hearings of Operation Belfast, the medical records of 
my two children and husband were tendered into evidence by officers of the PIC. I was not present 
when this occurred and it was purely fortuitous that I was to later discover it. Given the PIC's exemption 
from privacy legislation there was no way of making this body accountable for this gross intrusion into 
the privacy of my family members. A lengthy dispute ensued, with the PIC inspector refusing to agree to 
my request that these records be destroyed and an apology extended to my family. Oddly, more than 
two years after their tendering into evidence, and my failed attempt to have them officially destroyed 
through the official oversight body, I received a letter from the PIC informing me they had destroyed 
these records. I am left wondering why given they steadfastly maintained throughout our dispute they 
had made no mistake in tendering my family's medial records into their archive of evidence. My family 
are still left waiting for an apology. 
 
7 The PIC Inspectorate is a part-time office. Although vested with significant formal powers of 
investigation there do not appear to be the resources or strategic outlook to support their meaningful 
exercise. In fact, these formal powers have rarely, if ever, been invoked by the current inspector (see 
minutes of Parliamentary Committee Meetings with Inspector). There is also limited information about 
the workings of the office. In his own words, Justice Finlay, the Inspector of the PIC, enjoys regular 
meetings with the PIC Commissioner, and likens his oversight role to that of a 'physician' (Minutes, 
Fourth General Meeting with the Inspector of the PIC February 2001: 9). He describes his role thus: 
'We have now been in our respective roles for some three and half years throughout which the 
Commissioner, Assistant Commissioner, and I have enjoyed regular contact. From this has developed a 
relationship which permits easy discussion of the "issues of the day" and "longer term strategies"' 
(Justice Finlay, Minutes Parliamentary Committee, February 2001: 9). In practice the Inspector appears 
to be heavily reliant upon the PIC it is his responsibility to oversee, maintaining at least for some time 
an office within the PIC itself. This is the basis for my criticism that the oversight functions of PIC 
Inspectorate appear vastly inadequate and lacking in independence from the day to day management 
of the PIC. 
 
8 Leigh's relatives, lawyers from the Newcastle Legal Centre, Justice Moore and the Newcastle 
Homicide Victims Support Group are among the chorus of people who also made similar criticisms. 
 
9 I was fortunate enough during my ordeal with the PIC to enjoy the support of the Critical Social 
Sciences Research Group at the University of Western Sydney, but this vibrant intellectual community 
was swept away in the last restructure. 
 
